abstracts
published
In homage to Descartes and Spinoza: A Cosmo-Ontological Case for God
Integrating cosmological and ontological lines of reasoning, I argue that there is a self-necessary being that (a) serves as the sufficient condition for everything, that (b) has the most perfect collection of whatever attributes of perfection there might be, and that (c) is an independent, eternal, unique, simple, indivisible, immutable, all-actual, all-free, all-present, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, and personal creator of every expression of itself that everything is. My cosmo-ontological case for such a being, an everything-maker with the core features ascribed to the God of classical theism, addresses the standard worries plaguing these lines of reasoning: (1) the richness required of such a being dissolves it into many beings; (2) the metaphysical possibility of such a being is assumed on insufficient grounds; (3) the features we ascribe to such a being are mere human-all-too-human projections.
A Rationalist Defense of Determinism
Largely due to the popular allegation that contemporary science has uncovered indeterminism in the deepest known levels of physical reality, the debate as to whether humans have moral freedom, the sort of freedom on which moral responsibility depends, has put aside to some extent the traditional worry over whether determinism is true. As I argue in this article, however, there are powerful proofs for both chronological determinism and necessitarianism, forms of determinism that pose the most penetrative threat to human moral freedom. My ultimate hope is to show that, despite the robust case against human moral freedom that can be made without even relying on them, chronological determinism and necessitarianism should be regarded with renewed urgency.
The Universal Nature of a Spinozistic Substance
There is a longstanding alliance between rationalism and realism concerning universals. Spinoza does not disrupt that alliance. The nature of a Spinozistic substance, after all, is a universal. That is what I argue here. My central point is that a realist conception of universals is a key presumption behind Spinoza’s case for substance monism, a view historically recognized as a natural outgrowth of realism’s toleration of strict identity in diversity. After defending my central point (and, in addition, the secondary point that Spinoza is likely cognizant of this presumption), I respond to two concerns. First, I explain how the nature of a Spinozistic substance is a universal even though there can be only one instance of that nature. Second, I explain how Spinoza’s infamous rejection of universals does not contradict the fact that the nature of a substance is a universal.
Addressing Albert’s Anger Through Logic-Based Therapy
Here I recount my practicum sessions with Albert, a client who struggles with anger outbursts. Since it can be hard to draw a line between a DSM and a non-DSM issue, my first inclination as a practitioner of Logic-Based Therapy (LBT)—and in line with practice boundaries and referral standards affirmed by the National Philosophical Counseling Association (NPCA)—was to refer Albert to a licensed therapist. But since Albert was already seeing a therapist, and since Albert never loses cognizance of what he is doing during an outburst, I proceeded with Albert anyway. I did make it clear, however, that we would not focus directly on past traumas or substance abuse or family dynamics, but simply on his emotional reasoning in and around those times when he feels angry. Ultimately, I found (1) that damnation, can’tstipation, and perfectionism were the chief fallacies nurturing Albert’s tendency for outbursts and (2) that the uplifting philosophy of Spinoza would be especially effective at stoking self-respect, self-control, and metaphysical security (the direct antidotes to these fallacies) in someone like Albert, an informed and committed naturalist and determinist.
The Sufficiency of Spinozistic Attributes for their Finite Modes
Some passages throughout Spinoza’s body of works suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes, including the finite ones. Other passages suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature fails to provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes. My aim is to dispel this apparent tension. I argue that all finite modes are ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute. Furthermore, I explain how the Spinozistic positions that appear incompatible with this view are in fact compatible. As I see it, we should read those passages where Spinoza says that no finite mode ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute as saying merely that no finite mode ultimately follows in one-by-one fashion, independent of an infinite series of other modes, from the absolute nature of its attribute.
Spinoza’s Bundle Analysis of Substances Having Attributes
Considered in its absolute nature, Spinoza’s God is nothing more than the total collection of self-sufficient attributes. God is nothing more than the total collection of self-sufficient attributes in the sense that no attribute is a function of anything ontologically prior to it, and whatever may be in excess to the attributes is entirely a function of the attributes themselves. My bundle interpretation of the substance-attribute relationship in Spinoza’s thought harmonizes, so I argue in this paper, with various Spinozistic positions said to be in tension with it: God’s simplicity and nonderivativeness, the «sameness» of God’s attributes, the unity of parallel modes of different attributes, our being able to know God by knowing just one of his attributes, and so on. Through the help of mapping out how God’s attributes relate to one another in terms of Suárez’s famous taxonomy of distinctions, I explain, moreover, how my interpretation provides solutions to certain famous criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy, perhaps most importantly Leibniz’s objection to Spinoza’s ontological argument and Tschirnhaus’s puzzlement over Spinoza’s claim that Thought is the same as any other attribute even though it is more replete than any other attribute.
The Manner of Blackness in Nella Larsen's Passing
Commentators have suggested that Nella Larsen's Passing rejects the view that there is some sort of black essence. This article challenges this reading. Since Irene is the most vocal advocate of an essence in respect to which all blacks are homogenous, much of the evidence for thinking that Passing is skeptical about such an essence amounts to evidence for not trusting Irene's judgment in general, and for not trusting her judgment on this matter in particular. My arguments, then, will often involve explaining why Passing is not leading the reader to mistrust Irene's judgment on this matter. Now, what exactly is meant by a black essence is, explicitly in this book, mysterious. Nevertheless, this article intends to shed some light on how Passing understands the nature of this something, this je ne sais quoi, peculiar to blacks. My tentative interpretation is that this something is an intangible and indefinite manner of being that is neither a conscious choice nor an inborn fact of biology, but rather a given of culture. This article takes this, in effect, blackness manner to be, so Passing seems to indicate, a function of one's belief that one is black in a milieu of pervasive anti-black prejudice. Passing thus has something to offer those today who struggle to adjudicate between a pull towards essentialism and a pull towards constructionism. What Passing emphasizes in this discussion is the possibility that, in addition to biological and societal influences, one's mind state is a crucial ingredient to one's racial identity.
Tarzan on Guard Around Black Men
I have two main goals in this paper. First, I want to ward off the quite feasible interpretation that Tarzan, in his long speech towards the end of Edgar Rice Burroughs’ Tarzan of the Apes, is endorsing the view that black males are particularly ferocious. Second, I want to argue that Tarzan’s between-the-lines claim that he will continue to be on guard around black men is reasonable for his situation and not a function of racism. My additional hope is to show that if Tarzan of the Apes is a racist text, as it is widely believed to be, it undermines its own racism particularly through Tarzan’s speech, where he arguably endorses the view each person must be judged individually, case by case.
Spinoza and the Problem of Universals: A Study and Research Guide
This investigatory bibliographic project on Spinoza and the problem of universals draws four principal conclusions. (1) Spinoza is a realist concerning universals. Indeed, Spinoza endorses a radical form of realism known as universalism, the doctrine according to which every ontologically authentic entity is a universal. (2) Spinoza is a realist concerning universal species natures. He holds that a given species nature (such as human nature) is wholly instantiated in each species member. (3) Spinoza combines Aristotelian and Platonic realism. On the one hand, he holds that no universal is ontologically anterior to the one substance God. On the other hand, he holds that all universals with instantiations in the realm of modes are eternal forms ontologically anterior to those instantiations. (4) Spinoza’s pejorative remarks against universals are compatible with his realism. Such remarks are aimed merely at universals apprehendable by sense perception rather than pure intellect.
Is Aristotle’s Response to the Argument for Fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 Successful?
The goal of this paper is to figure out whether Aristotle’s response to the argument for fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 is a success. By “response” it is meant not simply the reasons Aristotle offers to highlight why fatalism does not accord with how we conduct our lives, but also the solution he devises to block the argument for fatalism. This paper finds that a) Aristotle’s argument for fatalism is essentially bivalence plus that the truth of a proposition implies necessity, b) that Aristotle’s solution is to restrict bivalence, c) that this solution is coherent, and d) that while this solution does not rule out the possibility of fatalism, it does succeed in blocking the argument for fatalism offered within chapter 9.
Gould Talking Past Dawkins on the Unit of Selection Issue
My general aim is to clarify the foundational difference between Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins concerning what biological entities are the units of selection in the process of evolution by natural selection. First, I recapitulate Gould's central objection to Dawkins's view that genes are the exclusive units of selection. According to Gould, it is absurd for Dawkins to think that genes are the exclusive units of selection when, after all, genes are not the exclusive interactors: those agents directly engaged with, directly impacted by, environmental pressures. Second, I argue that Gould's objection still goes through even when we take into consideration Sterelny and Kitcher's defense of gene selectionism in their admirable paper "The Return of the Gene." Third, I propose a strategy for defending Dawkins that I believe obviates Gould's objection. Drawing upon Elisabeth Lloyd's careful taxonomy of the various understandings of the unit of selection at play in the philosophy of biology literature, my proposal involves realizing that Dawkins endorses a different understanding of the unit of selection than Gould holds him to, an understanding that does not require genes to be the exclusive interactors.
Nominalist Analyses of an Entity Being Charactered
This paper is intended primarily as a reference tool for participants in the debate between realism and nominalism concerning universals. It provides an exhaustive catalogue of the basic analyses of an entity being charactered that nominalists can employ in both a constituent and nonconstituent ontology.
A Small Aid for Kooser Research
With exception to early essays by George von Glahn and Mark Sanders, serious critical scholarship on the writings of Ted Kooser began after the 1980 release of the now-classic Sure Signs, Kooser’s fifth major collection of poems. Looking back over the thirty-plus years since then, only about a dozen or so significant studies—none of which book-length—currently boulder out against the relative flatscape of secondary materials constituted mostly by quick and dirty reviews. Aside from the essays by Wes Mantooth, Allan Benn, and Mary K. Stillwell in this special issue of Midwestern Miscellany, the following works particularly stand out and, in my view, must be consulted by the Kooser scholar: David Baker’s “Ted’s Box”; William Barillas’s Chapter 7 of The Midwestern Pastoral; Victor Contoski’s “Words and Raincoats”; Dana Gioia’s “The Anonymity of the Regional Poet”; Jeff Gundy’s “Among the Erratics”; Jonathan Holden’s “The Chekov of American Poetry”; Denise Low’s “Sight in Motion”; David Mason’s “Introducing Ted Kooser”; and both Mary K. Stillwell’s “The ‘In Between’” and her “When a Walk is a Poem.”
Concerning the Resilience of Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument
Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action.
On the Possibility of Exactly Similar Tropes
In this paper I attempt to show, against certain versions of trope theory, that properties with analyzable particularity cannot be merely exactly similar: such properties are either particularized properties (tropes) that are dissimilar to every any other trope, or else universalized properties (universals). I argue that each of the most viable standard and nonstandard particularizers that can be employed to secure the numerical difference between exactly similar properties can only succeed in grounding the particularity of properties, that is, in having properties be tropes, at the expense of ruling out the possibility of their exact similarity. Here are the four nonstandard particularizers that I examine: the genealogy of a property, the history of a property, the causal effects of a property, and the duration of a property. And here are the two standard particularizers that I examine: the bearer of a property, by which I mean either a bare particular or a spatiotemporal location, and the property itself, by which I mean that the property is self-particularized. In my concluding remarks, I explain that the only remaining hope for preserving the possibility of exactly similar tropes is regarding properties as primitively particular, and that this must mean not that properties are self-particularized but that they are particularized due to nothing. I close by arguing that this may not help trope theory after all.
The Link Between Berkeley’s Refutation of Abstraction and His Refutation of Materialism
This paper engages the controversy as to whether there is a link bet-ween Berkeley’s refutation of abstraction and his refutation of materialism. I argue that there is a strong link. In the opening paragraph I show that materialism being true requires and is required by the possibility of abstraction, and that the obviousness of this fact suggests that the real controversy is whether there is a link between Berkeley’s refutation of materialism and his refutation of the possibility of framing abstract incomplete ideas and abstract general ideas. Although Berkeley can still defeat materialism without relying on his arguments that directly refute the possibility of framing abstract incomplete ideas and abstract general ideas, I contend that there is still a strong link between his refutation of materialism and his refutation of the possibility of framing these ideas. First, I show that the truth of the canonic version of materialism, according to which primary qualities are mind-independent and inhere in material substances, requires the possibility of the mind framing both of these ideas. Second, I show that there is a sense in which the truth of materialism is required by the possibility of either of these ideas.
links
<in progress>
scholarly
Literary
Characters
writing
scholarly
FAQ
Visit my Substack: Hive Being
Visit my Substack: Hive Being
And if any one advances anything new which contradicts, perhaps threatens to overturn, the creed which we have for years repeated, and have handed down to others, all passions are raised against him, and every effort is made to crush him. People resist with all their might; they act as if they neither heard nor could comprehend; they speak of the new view with contempt, as if it were not worth the trouble of even so much as an investigation or a regard, and thus a new truth may wait a long time before it can make its way. . . . [S]uch people continue in error because they are indebted to it for their existence. They would otherwise have to learn everything over again, and that would be very inconvenient. —Goethe (Conversations with Eckermann)
Featured Blog Posts
meant to shake off a demon, the demon
asks with alacrity: “So where we going?”


“Squatter” is a confrontational prose-poem that operates as a reductio ad absurdum of contemporary anti-property and anti-border moral reasoning. Rather than arguing directly for or against a political position, the text adopts the internal logic of radical anti-ownership discourse and drives it relentlessly to its most extreme implications. In doing so, the piece exposes what it portrays as a catastrophic moral vacuum produced when concepts such as property, consent, and exclusion are dissolved without replacement.
Formally, “Squatter” is structured as a second-person indictment. The repeated address—“you”—forces the reader into the position of the liberal moral subject: the self-consciously virtuous homeowner who denounces borders, celebrates hospitality, and affirms the slogan “no human is illegal.” The poem’s rhetorical strategy is not to refute this position from the outside, but to inhabit it so fully that it collapses under its own weight.
The central analogy—between national borders and the threshold of a private home—is the poem’s engine. By insisting that the same logic used to delegitimize borders must also delegitimize property lines, the text erases distinctions that are typically treated as morally intuitive: guest versus intruder, consent versus violation, refuge versus occupation. The poem’s repeated refrain that contracts and deeds are “theater” underscores its critique of legal formalism, suggesting that all ownership claims rest on historical force rather than moral legitimacy.
Crucially, the poem does not stop at abstract reasoning. It escalates deliberately, introducing increasingly unbearable consequences of the logic it adopts. The argument insists that nothing—not behavior, not harm, not violation—can reinstate exclusion once exclusion has been declared illegitimate in principle. By doing so, the poem dramatizes a core philosophical problem: a moral system that abolishes boundaries entirely cannot account for protection, responsibility, or justice.
The text’s treatment of “equity” and “whiteness” sharpens this critique. Rather than merely condemning historical injustice, the poem depicts a framework in which moral standing is asymmetrically assigned by identity, such that rights are no longer universal but contingent. In this framework, exclusion is simultaneously forbidden in theory and practiced in fact—only now along racial and ideological lines. The poem frames this as a contradiction masked by moral language, where performative generosity (“you allow”) conceals ongoing power over inclusion and expulsion.
Stylistically, “Squatter” draws on the tradition of satirical moral philosophy—from Swift’s A Modest Proposal to modern polemical essays that weaponize sincerity. Its tone is deliberately merciless, refusing irony markers or authorial distance. This creates an interpretive risk: the piece can be misread as endorsement if its satirical extremity is not recognized. Yet this risk is part of the work’s design. The poem tests the reader’s willingness to follow a moral argument past the point where intuition revolts.
The final line, “Welcome home, stranger,” lands as a bitter inversion of hospitality. What begins as moral openness ends as total abdication of responsibility. Home becomes meaningless; welcome becomes compulsory; belonging becomes incoherent. The poem’s title, “Squatter,” thus refers not only to the figure who occupies space without permission, but to the moral subject who occupies a position without foundations.
In sum, “Squatter” is not a poem about immigration or property per se. It is a poem about moral absolutism, about what happens when negation replaces judgment, and when slogans are treated as axioms rather than starting points for ethical reasoning. Its extremity is intentional: the poem seeks not to persuade gently, but to force a reckoning with the consequences of ideas that are often affirmed without being fully examined.
Meta Description
“Squatter” is a polemical prose-poem that pushes anti-border and anti-property logic to its extreme conclusions. By collapsing distinctions between home and nation, guest and intruder, the poem critiques moral absolutism and exposes the ethical void created when exclusion is declared impossible in principle.
Keywords
polemical poetry, satire, property ethics, borders, moral absolutism, reductio ad absurdum, hospitality, ownership, political rhetoric, ethical contradiction, second-person address, radical critique, modern moral philosophy.