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statement
teaching
Introductory Remarks
One of my central pedagogical goals is to cultivate an appreciation for the merit and resourcefulness of the views under examination in the class, and for the satisfaction involved in elucidating such merit and resourcefulness. Many students, I find, are quick to raise objections and stop there, proud of their apparent superiority over the thinker in question. I want students to have the determination, honesty, and research skills, however, to see if replies to such objections have been made. I want them to have the generosity, mettle, and creativity to construct replies true to the constraints of the view, thus allowing those objections to serve as opportunities for deeper understanding. Although I receive pleasure simply in elucidating the positions and arguments of philosophers, and although my scholarship benefits from the fresh angles students offer on topics occupying my research, the base-level prospect of promoting an attitude of charity and reconciliation is what primarily draws me to teaching. Hence my satisfaction when students make serious efforts to raise problems for a view to which they are deeply committed and to defend a view to which they do not ascribe. Hence my satisfaction when student papers not only show the motivations and strengths of competing positions on a certain issue, but attempt to accommodate the insights of these positions in the process of defending a particular thesis.
Principle of Charity
The principle of charity drives my teaching just as much as it does my research. I use several techniques in the classroom to encourage sympathetic interpretation.
First, I make clear to my students right away that when I ask them to be charitable in their interpretive practices I do not mean that they should, for instance, assume that a philosopher did not endorse view V because view V has theoretical problems or is unorthodox or unpalatable from our standpoint. When we filter what others say in a way that aligns with what we think, which is what sometimes is done in the name of charity, we become closed off from novelties and challenges. Ab-using the principle of charity in this way is particularly a problem when discussing historical figures or figures from other cultures whose beliefs, distinctions, and arguments may be drastically different from our own. Although it may be beneficial for students to think about what might lead someone to endorse, say, the sort of view of the Absolute that Schelling did (as opposed to, say, the sort of view of the Absolute that Hegel did), that is not what charitable interpretation of Schelling consists in. Charitable interpretation of Schelling in this situation consists in making the strongest case for what would lead Schelling to endorse the sort of view of the Absolute that he did. Here, and unlike in the first case, one’s speculation must honor the constraints of Schelling’s philosophical vision.
Second, and in order to illustrate this point, I will sometimes have students do the following sort of exercise. If, for example, the class is discussing Galen Strawson’s argument against the possibility of moral responsibility, I might start out by asking students to come up with an argument in defense of the view that moral responsibility is impossible. Since most students do not agree that moral responsibility is impossible, this exercise itself is good first step towards inhabiting another thinker (which is in short what I think charitable interpretation is all about) insofar as it at least gives students the practice of stepping beyond their own perspective. Then, after having studied Strawson’s argument in the class and at home, I have students develop an argument against the possibility of moral responsibility in a way that is true to the constraints of Strawson’s vision. After going through such an exercise, students have a concrete example of the difference between understanding what is best from their own standpoint and seeing what is best from another’s.
In history classes I will do the same sort of exercise. First I might have the students give the best argument for why someone would say that God is an extended thing. Then, after studying Spinoza, I would have them explain why Spinoza thinks that God is an extended thing. In the best case scenarios, students do so in a way that is more forceful and compelling than Spinoza (even while honoring his vision). When I incorporate in-class debates in such history courses, I do not have one group arguing, for example, that it is best to conceive of God as extended and the other group arguing that it is best to conceive God as unextended. Instead, I limit the groups to relying only on, say, Spinoza in defending the view that God is extended and relying only on, say, Descartes in defending the opposing view. And so when it is inevitably brought up how Descartes’s God, which is not an extended thing, can create extended things, the students are not allowed to use any resources beyond what Descartes said, or would most likely say, when faced with such a problem.
General Teaching Procedures
My classes have traditionally been a mixture of lecture, discussion, student-presentation, and in-class exercise. The proportion has often depended on the level of the course and the nature of the material. I have been teaching for over 10 years now. My typical procedure over that time has been to go lecture-heavy. Over the last few years, however, I have put much more emphasis on student presentations. For two-thirds of even my intro courses now, I have students present the material and lead the discussion. Standing at the back of the room, I participate in the seminar as a facilitator, clarifying arguments when needed, defending the author when challenged, raising objections to the author, and encouraging students to develop replies on the author’s behalf. Unless we are dealing with a highly difficult text, only occasionally do I take center stage (literally and figuratively).
My favorite courses in school were those that were strictly top-down lecture, and so I do feel a strong pull towards that extreme. Nevertheless, I find that giving students the opportunity to synthesize and articulate what is happening in the readings (the central claims, arguments, assumptions, objections, replies), and to make critical comments about the reading, helps to demystify philosophy and provides students with opportunities to develop their verbal communication skills. It is also nice to be able to write in a letter of recommendation that student x successfully taught a class session at the college level.
When I do conduct the discussion from a center stage position, which is mostly at the beginning of each semester, I aim to model for students how to organize one’s thinking when working through a philosophical problem. My lectures, which are more accurately described as conversation-inviting but thoroughly planned presentations, are concerned primarily with making clear the general vision of the complicated, and sometimes inaccessible, texts they are reading. Students come to class in order to assist in the working out of this general vision and, in addition, react to what has been said, raise possible topics to write about, raise objections and replies to what has been said, and enter into details about certain interpretive debates on the issue under discussion. Such experience provides them with a better sense of why the thinkers are doing what they are doing. I find that students feel rewarded when they reconstruct the details of a thinker’s views on their own, guided by the reading trajectory and basic arguments that they themselves have helped me articulate in class time. In an era where content is freely available on the internet, it is important for students to feel that coming to class is important for their education. Students in my classes understand that coming to class is important not only because I scaffold their learning (providing them, for example, with questions to think about as they engage with manageable reading assignments that build on each other), but because working out positions and arguments through live discussion is something hard to attain on one’s own and leads to deeper grasp of the material.
Here are some of my strategies for maintaining a student-involved, discussion-inviting, higher-thinking atmosphere at all times in the classroom. I wear my fallibility on my sleeve so that students feel comfortable questioning me and helping me better express my points. Indeed, I wear my fallibility on my sleeve so that I myself am more relaxed and open to learning. I talk with and to students rather than at them. I direct students to talk with each other as opposed to solely at me when they raise their points. I entertain and ask questions all the way through the period. Sometimes I bring in guest experts. To further challenge exceptional students, I present them with the possibility of investigating topics not discussed during the class period, or running a class or review session for practice teaching the content that they know so well. As a remedy for the chance that class time calls for me to do most of the talking, either because of the nature of the material or the needs of students or even my own needs, I try to make up for the potential loss through reserving a space in class or out of class for discussion.
Discussion outside of the classroom, whether through discussion boards, email, or office visits, is especially important in my case. Because of my conversational and enthusiastic style of presentation, students are quick to participate in class discussion. Creating a relaxed and democratic atmosphere where each student feels included and respected, where each student feels that he or she can learn about and participate in the subject, is intentional on my part. One drawback, however, is that this can stand in the way of getting through the planned decent minimum of material. Since I try to steer a middle course between cultivating learning experiences and covering material, promotion of discussion outside of the classroom is crucial. If I find that the conversation is getting too far off topic or the class is getting oversaturated with views and arguments from various voices in the room, I direct them to carry out the conversation on the discussion elsewhere with each other or with me personally. These conversations sometimes continue in parallel to the length of the rest of the course and they are sometimes the basis of papers.
statement
research
The central methodological principle guiding my research is the one guiding my teaching and mentorship: the principle of charity. Whether dealing with the dead or the living, I try to be a sympathetic interpreter. I am not affiliated with the sort of charity that says that since view V is counterintuitive or theoretically problematic we should not therefore seriously entertain the possibility of philosopher P endorsing V. Such projection of our own beliefs closes us off from the challenges that more exotic views can pose to our own beliefs. (What would become of Berkeley as a result of such charitable interpretation?) By “charitable interpretation” I mean, instead, sympathetic-empowering interpretation, interpretation that makes a concerted effort at exposing the motivation, strength, resourcefulness, and coherence of the work under examination, all while honoring the constraints of its vision. Rather than raising objections to a thinker and stopping there, I try to offer replies on his or her behalf, making sure to honor his or her principles and beliefs in so doing. When I perceive a problem with someone’s view, my first instinct is to allow such a situation to serve as an occasion for me to figure out where I may have gone wrong; my first instinct, in other words, is to regard objections to a view as opportunities for animating and unpacking that view. Such charitable interpretation is a minimum requirement of good citizenship.
When dealing particularly with philosophers, charitable interpretation is especially going to be a matter of deep effort at dispelling any appearance of inconsistency and fallacious reasoning in a way, of course, that honors the commitments of the person being interpreted. My default assumption when dealing with expert philosophers is that all of their commitments, both those explicitly stated and those entailed by those explicitly stated, are consistent with each other and that their conclusions would at least be probable on the assumption that their supporting premises are true. Sometimes, no doubt, this default assumption will fail to match reality. Given the limited intellectual powers of humans and their tendency toward wishful thinking, even the most developed in their philosophical expertise will make logical slips. But even though I do not close myself off from the possibility that a philosopher is illogical just because my default and hard-to-break assumption is that he or she is not, and even though my natural inclination is in fact to regard past thinkers as open to criticism by contemporaries, I believe at the same time that one must attempt to embody the thinkers in question and, especially when dealing with a thinker whose expertise is renowned, explain away any apparent illogicality. Such effort, moreover, is expected not just with contextualizing and exegetical sorts of engagements with philosopher P, but even with other sorts of engagement that I respect and practice: the sort of engagement that aims to reconstruct more impactful version of P’s view, or that aims to be critical and evaluative of P’s view, or that aims to explain what P would or should say when confronted with a given situation, or that aims to use P simply as a launching off point for one’s own contribution to contemporary philosophical issues.
Despite the disparate subject-matter of my published and unpublished works, many have as their central aim sympathetic interpretation: trying to understand where a philosopher is coming from, how his or her view is consistent, how his or her view is more resourceful than acknowledged, and so on. This should be evident from my project abstracts here.
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FAQ
I am much more inclined to support the old truth that we, properly speaking, have only eyes and ears for what we know. The musician by profession hears, in an orchestral performance, every instrument and every single tone, whilst one unacquainted with the art is wrapped up in the massive effect of the whole. A man merely bent upon enjoyment sees in a green or flowery meadow only a pleasant plain, whilst the eye of a botanist discovers an endless detail of the most varied plants and grasses. . . . [That said,] we . . . are very likely to fall too easily into [a] pedantic conceit when we do not look beyond the narrow circle which surrounds us. I therefore like to look about me in foreign nations, and advise every one to do the same. . . . [T]he epoch of World literature is at hand, and every one must strive to hasten its approach. But, while we thus value what is foreign, we must not bind ourselves to anything in particular, and regard it as a model. We must not give this value to the Chinese, or the Servian, or Calderon, or the Nibelungen; but if we really want a pattern, we must always return to the ancient Greeks, in whose works the beauty of mankind is constantly represented. All the rest we must look at only historically, appropriating to ourselves what is good, so far as it goes.—Goethe (Conversations with Eckermann)
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plastic figurines from the film coming soon
as puff-eyed parents, bedside, pray for time


"White Supremacy on Its Deathbed" is the most formally ambitious, politically volatile, and intellectually demanding work in the project — a lyrical essay that refuses every available category for its containment. It is not a polemic, not a memoir, not a work of cultural criticism, not a prose poem, though it borrows the instruments of all four. Its governing formal claim, announced in the preface and enacted across six chapters, is that the most devastating threats to Black flourishing in contemporary America arrive not from the residual energies of white supremacy but from the apparatus constructed in white supremacy's name — and that this reversal is the defining irony of the present moment, an irony so severe it has the structure of tragedy.
The Sowell and Washington epigraphs establish the essay's intellectual lineage before the preface begins. Both figures are positioned as prophets whose warnings went unheeded — Sowell's observation that racism has been placed "under new management," Washington's warning about race-problem solvers who "don't want the patient to get well." The essay inherits from both a suspicion of institutionalized grievance, a commitment to Black agency as the only durable foundation for Black flourishing, and a willingness to say what the dominant discourse has made professionally dangerous to say. What the essay adds to this tradition is the formal apparatus of a lyrical essay that refuses the sober register of policy argument and instead floods its argument with the full resources of literary violence — the grotesque, the satirical, the scatological, the pornographic, the comedic, and the tragic operating simultaneously.
The preface establishes the essay's central thesis with compressed clarity: that the "antiracist movement, in its mainstream form at least, nourishes itself ultimately upon the bogus notion that white supremacy — although 'now invisible most of the time, to most eyes' — flourishes today well beyond merely the American marrow from which it supposedly can never be removed." The move is rhetorical and argumentative simultaneously: by positioning DiAngelo's framework as the object of critique and citing McWhorter, Chait, Loury, Steele, and Hughes as critical allies, the essay places itself within a specific tradition of Black and liberal dissent from progressive orthodoxy, a tradition with genuine intellectual pedigree that the dominant discourse has systematically marginalized. The preface also discloses the personal — the cancellation of the author's professorship on grounds that his creative writing was "unsettling especially to vulnerable populations" — which grounds the essay's animus in specific biographical injury rather than abstract ideological position. This disclosure is crucial: it tells us that the essay is not a detached analysis but a document of genuine wounds, that the furious intelligence driving it is in part the intelligence of someone who has been hurt by the very apparatus he critiques.
Chapter 1, "Gator Bait," establishes the essay's central rhetorical device and sustains it across hundreds of pages: the extended rhetorical question "what might white supremacy do from its deathbed?" followed by the refrain "It could just sit back and revel in our world where..." The device is formally brilliant because it inverts the standard antiracist framework without abandoning its terms. Rather than arguing that white supremacy is absent, the essay argues that white supremacy's most effective remaining operation is to do nothing — to allow the apparatus of antiracism to perform the work of degradation, infantilization, and dependency that white supremacy itself could never accomplish openly. The irony accumulates across the chapter's historical inventory of Black achievement and opportunity: the essay asks what room white supremacy has to grow in a time when Black Americans have reached every pinnacle of American life, and answers that it needs no room because the work is being done for it. Coleman Hughes's opening epigraph frames America as "one of the least racist places on Earth," and the chapter's historical inventory is designed to substantiate that claim against the dominant narrative — not to deny that racism exists but to argue that the dominant narrative's exaggerations have become more damaging than the residual racism they nominally address.
Chapter 2, "Macaroni Sounds (Over That Brrrap-Brrrap-Brrrap)," is the essay's most formally extreme section and its most legally treacherous. The extended catalogue of rap lyrics — drawn from across decades and artists, ranging from the merely raunchy to the genuinely criminal — is the chapter's central formal argument, and that argument is structural rather than merely illustrative. The sheer accumulation is the point: the catalogue is too long to be selective, too comprehensive to be dismissed as cherry-picking. What the essay is arguing through form is that the monolith of hypersexual, hyperviolent imagery in mainstream Black popular culture is not an aberration but a system — and that the system's persistence, its escalation, its normalization, and its celebration by the very progressive apparatus that claims to fight Black degradation constitutes a catastrophe for Black dignity that no honest account of the present can avoid. The C. Delores Tucker speech — intercut with Sukihana's lyrics in a formally devastating counterpoint — is the chapter's emotional and argumentative center: Tucker's 1993 anti-gangsta-rap testimony, delivered with the full moral authority of the civil rights tradition, is shown to have been not only ignored but actively overrun by the very forces she named. The chapter's invented La'Cinda'Relle Cinderella parody is the essay's most formally audacious set piece — a sustained satirical fiction that enacts its argument through pastiche, using the genre machinery of the fairy tale to render visible what the culture has normalized. That it is simultaneously funny, devastating, and genuinely offensive is the point: the essay refuses to make its critique comfortable, insisting that the reader who laughs at La'Cinda's story or who winces at it or who is aroused by elements of it is implicated in the cultural system the essay is examining.
Chapter 3, "Toby in Kunta Mask," shifts the essay's focus from cultural to educational institutions, and its governing argument is the most philosophically sustained in the work: that the lowering of standards for Black students, the pathologizing of intellectual achievement as "acting white," the substitution of grievance pedagogy for genuine education, and the condemnation of the very Enlightenment values — reason, objectivity, scientific inquiry, diligence — that have historically enabled marginalized groups to compete and flourish, constitute a form of anti-Black racism more insidious than any cross-burning. The chapter's use of invented classroom scenarios, spoken-word performances, and hypothetical courses like "Afro-Mathematics" operates as satirical defamiliarization — taking the real logic of certain progressive pedagogical positions and following it to its conclusions with merciless literalism. The chapter's intellectual touchstone is McWhorter's observation that what is being implicitly communicated to Black students is "we can't cut it" — and that this communication, however kindly intended, is the most devastatingly racist message available. The Marva Collins reference is the chapter's positive counter-example: a Black educator who held Black kindergarteners to demanding intellectual standards and achieved remarkable results, a figure whose approach the dominant progressive framework would now classify as oppressive.
Chapter 4, "Open Season," is the essay's most politically direct chapter, and its catalogue of ways that affirmative action and special dispensation have simultaneously patronized and damaged Black people draws heavily on the established conservative and centrist Black intellectual tradition — Loury, Steele, McWhorter — while pushing that tradition's logic further than it typically goes in respectable venues. The chapter's argument is that the infantilization of Black people through lowered expectations is not a side effect of well-intentioned policy but its necessary structural consequence: that the logic of "you cannot be expected to compete under these conditions" contains within it the premise of permanent inferiority, and that this premise — however wrapped in the language of justice and compassion — reproduces the essential content of the white supremacist worldview it claims to oppose. The chapter's most intellectually serious move is the distinction between emergency medicine and chronic dependency: affirmative action as a "syphon" to start a flow that then requires individual development to sustain, rather than as a permanent substitute for that development. This is not a novel argument — it is recognizably Steele's and Loury's — but the essay deploys it with a ferocity and a fullness of implication that the more measured academic versions rarely reach.
Chapter 5, "Nazi Alert," is the essay's most formally anarchic chapter and its most deliberately provocative. The extended catalogue of white self-abasement — the Race2Dinner dinner party, the boot-kissing campus ceremony, the various white progressive confessionals, the university convocation speech — is the chapter's rhetorical engine, and its operation is complex. On one level it is satire, following the logic of certain progressive positions to absurd but not entirely implausible conclusions. On another level it is a serious argument about the psychological and social consequences of a culture that has normalized the public performance of white guilt as a substitute for genuine engagement with racial inequality. The Thomas Chatterton Williams epigraph frames the chapter's central claim: that mainstream antiracism "mirrors ideas of race — specifically the specialness of whiteness — that white supremacist thinkers cherish," that both sides "eagerly reduce people to abstract color categories" and "feed off and legitimize each other." The chapter's catalogue of the various double-binds whites face — damned for speaking, damned for silence; damned for engaging with Black culture, damned for not engaging; damned for defending themselves against accusations, damned for failing to defend themselves — is the essay's most formally precise argument about how the antiracist framework has made productive interracial discourse structurally impossible. The chapter also contains the essay's most controversial material: the extended passages describing rising white radicalization and the fantasies of retributive violence. These passages are not endorsements — they are the essay's most urgent warnings, rendered in the register of inevitability rather than desire, showing the trajectory that sustained dehumanization historically produces.
Chapter 6, "Let My People Go!" is the essay's shortest and most direct chapter, and it closes on Farrakhan's inversion — "Pharaoh has already let you go! But it is you who have not let Pharaoh go!" — as its governing image. The chapter synthesizes the preceding argument into its cleanest formulation: that the "biggest threat to goodwill between whites and blacks is the various things done in the name of an 'anti-nazi commitment to inclusion and equity'"; that the biggest inciter of individual racism on both sides is all that keeps being done to fight a systemic racism "long ago put into remission"; that "the best evidence for the lie that white supremacy continues to have a pervasive grip over this country are the various things done in the respectable (and big-money) name of 'dismantling white supremacy.'" The Coleman Hughes epigraph frames the chapter as a moral-panic analysis: the antiracist movement as a species of the same mass delusion that produced the Satanic daycare hysteria of the 1980s — a phenomenon that "looks like obvious absurdity from the outside" while seeming "totally reasonable to those on the inside." The chapter ends not with resolution but with the trajectory the essay has been tracing throughout: a call for the alignment of "our perceptions with our reality" as the only path toward the racial healing that the dominant discourse, in its exaggerations and its incentives, actively forecloses.
Formally, the essay's most significant achievement is its management of tone across its enormous length. The "It could just sit back and revel" refrain functions as a kind of liturgical structure — the repeated phrase creating a cumulative ironic weight that grows heavier with each iteration, so that by the essay's final pages the refrain carries the full weight of everything that has preceded it. The essay moves between registers — academic citation, satirical fiction, lyrical description, catalogue, invective, confession — with a fluency that refuses the reader any stable interpretive position. One cannot read it as simple polemic because its formal complexity exceeds polemic. One cannot read it as detached analysis because its personal investment is too fully disclosed. One cannot read it as satire because its factual claims are too seriously documented. It is closest, in the tradition of African American letters, to certain modes of the jeremiad — the prophetic denunciation of a people's failure to live up to their own stated ideals — but its target is not the nation's failure to honor its Black citizens. Its target is the failure of the institutions claiming to honor those citizens to honestly reckon with what that honoring requires.
The essay's ultimate subject is Black agency — its suppression, its necessity, and its recovery. Every chapter circles back to the same argument: that genuine Black power requires the willingness to look honestly at the full complexity of Black life, including the aspects that progressive orthodoxy has made taboo to examine; that the dependency cultivated by the antiracist industrial complex is the most effective remaining mechanism for Black subordination; and that the path out runs through exactly the qualities — reason, rigor, self-examination, accountability, aspiration — that the dominant discourse has classified as expressions of whiteness. The essay's anger is not the anger of white supremacy. It is the anger of someone who believes Black people are capable of more than the framework built to protect them allows them to be.
Meta Description
A lyrical essay of extraordinary formal ambition and political volatility — moving across six chapters from historical inventory through cultural critique, educational analysis, satirical fiction, and radical political provocation — to argue that the contemporary antiracist industrial complex constitutes the most effective remaining mechanism for Black subordination, its infantilization, dependency cultivation, and standard-lowering performing the work that white supremacy itself could no longer accomplish openly, leaving the deathbed patient to sit back and revel.
Keywords
White Supremacy on Its Deathbed, lyrical essay, antiracist critique, Black agency, victimology narrative, Glenn Loury, Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell, John McWhorter, Coleman Hughes, C. Delores Tucker, gangsta rap and Black culture, affirmative action critique, Enlightenment values, moral panic, jeremiad form, satirical fiction, La'Cinda'Relle, Race2Dinner parody, dependency and dignity, progressive orthodoxy, Black intellectual dissent, contemporary American political essay, formal complexity, ironic refrain, racial double-bind