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statement
teaching
Introductory Remarks
One of my central pedagogical goals is to cultivate an appreciation for the merit and resourcefulness of the views under examination in the class, and for the satisfaction involved in elucidating such merit and resourcefulness. Many students, I find, are quick to raise objections and stop there, proud of their apparent superiority over the thinker in question. I want students to have the determination, honesty, and research skills, however, to see if replies to such objections have been made. I want them to have the generosity, mettle, and creativity to construct replies true to the constraints of the view, thus allowing those objections to serve as opportunities for deeper understanding. Although I receive pleasure simply in elucidating the positions and arguments of philosophers, and although my scholarship benefits from the fresh angles students offer on topics occupying my research, the base-level prospect of promoting an attitude of charity and reconciliation is what primarily draws me to teaching. Hence my satisfaction when students make serious efforts to raise problems for a view to which they are deeply committed and to defend a view to which they do not ascribe. Hence my satisfaction when student papers not only show the motivations and strengths of competing positions on a certain issue, but attempt to accommodate the insights of these positions in the process of defending a particular thesis.
Principle of Charity
The principle of charity drives my teaching just as much as it does my research. I use several techniques in the classroom to encourage sympathetic interpretation.
First, I make clear to my students right away that when I ask them to be charitable in their interpretive practices I do not mean that they should, for instance, assume that a philosopher did not endorse view V because view V has theoretical problems or is unorthodox or unpalatable from our standpoint. When we filter what others say in a way that aligns with what we think, which is what sometimes is done in the name of charity, we become closed off from novelties and challenges. Ab-using the principle of charity in this way is particularly a problem when discussing historical figures or figures from other cultures whose beliefs, distinctions, and arguments may be drastically different from our own. Although it may be beneficial for students to think about what might lead someone to endorse, say, the sort of view of the Absolute that Schelling did (as opposed to, say, the sort of view of the Absolute that Hegel did), that is not what charitable interpretation of Schelling consists in. Charitable interpretation of Schelling in this situation consists in making the strongest case for what would lead Schelling to endorse the sort of view of the Absolute that he did. Here, and unlike in the first case, one’s speculation must honor the constraints of Schelling’s philosophical vision.
Second, and in order to illustrate this point, I will sometimes have students do the following sort of exercise. If, for example, the class is discussing Galen Strawson’s argument against the possibility of moral responsibility, I might start out by asking students to come up with an argument in defense of the view that moral responsibility is impossible. Since most students do not agree that moral responsibility is impossible, this exercise itself is good first step towards inhabiting another thinker (which is in short what I think charitable interpretation is all about) insofar as it at least gives students the practice of stepping beyond their own perspective. Then, after having studied Strawson’s argument in the class and at home, I have students develop an argument against the possibility of moral responsibility in a way that is true to the constraints of Strawson’s vision. After going through such an exercise, students have a concrete example of the difference between understanding what is best from their own standpoint and seeing what is best from another’s.
In history classes I will do the same sort of exercise. First I might have the students give the best argument for why someone would say that God is an extended thing. Then, after studying Spinoza, I would have them explain why Spinoza thinks that God is an extended thing. In the best case scenarios, students do so in a way that is more forceful and compelling than Spinoza (even while honoring his vision). When I incorporate in-class debates in such history courses, I do not have one group arguing, for example, that it is best to conceive of God as extended and the other group arguing that it is best to conceive God as unextended. Instead, I limit the groups to relying only on, say, Spinoza in defending the view that God is extended and relying only on, say, Descartes in defending the opposing view. And so when it is inevitably brought up how Descartes’s God, which is not an extended thing, can create extended things, the students are not allowed to use any resources beyond what Descartes said, or would most likely say, when faced with such a problem.
General Teaching Procedures
My classes have traditionally been a mixture of lecture, discussion, student-presentation, and in-class exercise. The proportion has often depended on the level of the course and the nature of the material. I have been teaching for over 10 years now. My typical procedure over that time has been to go lecture-heavy. Over the last few years, however, I have put much more emphasis on student presentations. For two-thirds of even my intro courses now, I have students present the material and lead the discussion. Standing at the back of the room, I participate in the seminar as a facilitator, clarifying arguments when needed, defending the author when challenged, raising objections to the author, and encouraging students to develop replies on the author’s behalf. Unless we are dealing with a highly difficult text, only occasionally do I take center stage (literally and figuratively).
My favorite courses in school were those that were strictly top-down lecture, and so I do feel a strong pull towards that extreme. Nevertheless, I find that giving students the opportunity to synthesize and articulate what is happening in the readings (the central claims, arguments, assumptions, objections, replies), and to make critical comments about the reading, helps to demystify philosophy and provides students with opportunities to develop their verbal communication skills. It is also nice to be able to write in a letter of recommendation that student x successfully taught a class session at the college level.
When I do conduct the discussion from a center stage position, which is mostly at the beginning of each semester, I aim to model for students how to organize one’s thinking when working through a philosophical problem. My lectures, which are more accurately described as conversation-inviting but thoroughly planned presentations, are concerned primarily with making clear the general vision of the complicated, and sometimes inaccessible, texts they are reading. Students come to class in order to assist in the working out of this general vision and, in addition, react to what has been said, raise possible topics to write about, raise objections and replies to what has been said, and enter into details about certain interpretive debates on the issue under discussion. Such experience provides them with a better sense of why the thinkers are doing what they are doing. I find that students feel rewarded when they reconstruct the details of a thinker’s views on their own, guided by the reading trajectory and basic arguments that they themselves have helped me articulate in class time. In an era where content is freely available on the internet, it is important for students to feel that coming to class is important for their education. Students in my classes understand that coming to class is important not only because I scaffold their learning (providing them, for example, with questions to think about as they engage with manageable reading assignments that build on each other), but because working out positions and arguments through live discussion is something hard to attain on one’s own and leads to deeper grasp of the material.
Here are some of my strategies for maintaining a student-involved, discussion-inviting, higher-thinking atmosphere at all times in the classroom. I wear my fallibility on my sleeve so that students feel comfortable questioning me and helping me better express my points. Indeed, I wear my fallibility on my sleeve so that I myself am more relaxed and open to learning. I talk with and to students rather than at them. I direct students to talk with each other as opposed to solely at me when they raise their points. I entertain and ask questions all the way through the period. Sometimes I bring in guest experts. To further challenge exceptional students, I present them with the possibility of investigating topics not discussed during the class period, or running a class or review session for practice teaching the content that they know so well. As a remedy for the chance that class time calls for me to do most of the talking, either because of the nature of the material or the needs of students or even my own needs, I try to make up for the potential loss through reserving a space in class or out of class for discussion.
Discussion outside of the classroom, whether through discussion boards, email, or office visits, is especially important in my case. Because of my conversational and enthusiastic style of presentation, students are quick to participate in class discussion. Creating a relaxed and democratic atmosphere where each student feels included and respected, where each student feels that he or she can learn about and participate in the subject, is intentional on my part. One drawback, however, is that this can stand in the way of getting through the planned decent minimum of material. Since I try to steer a middle course between cultivating learning experiences and covering material, promotion of discussion outside of the classroom is crucial. If I find that the conversation is getting too far off topic or the class is getting oversaturated with views and arguments from various voices in the room, I direct them to carry out the conversation on the discussion elsewhere with each other or with me personally. These conversations sometimes continue in parallel to the length of the rest of the course and they are sometimes the basis of papers.
statement
research
The central methodological principle guiding my research is the one guiding my teaching and mentorship: the principle of charity. Whether dealing with the dead or the living, I try to be a sympathetic interpreter. I am not affiliated with the sort of charity that says that since view V is counterintuitive or theoretically problematic we should not therefore seriously entertain the possibility of philosopher P endorsing V. Such projection of our own beliefs closes us off from the challenges that more exotic views can pose to our own beliefs. (What would become of Berkeley as a result of such charitable interpretation?) By “charitable interpretation” I mean, instead, sympathetic-empowering interpretation, interpretation that makes a concerted effort at exposing the motivation, strength, resourcefulness, and coherence of the work under examination, all while honoring the constraints of its vision. Rather than raising objections to a thinker and stopping there, I try to offer replies on his or her behalf, making sure to honor his or her principles and beliefs in so doing. When I perceive a problem with someone’s view, my first instinct is to allow such a situation to serve as an occasion for me to figure out where I may have gone wrong; my first instinct, in other words, is to regard objections to a view as opportunities for animating and unpacking that view. Such charitable interpretation is a minimum requirement of good citizenship.
When dealing particularly with philosophers, charitable interpretation is especially going to be a matter of deep effort at dispelling any appearance of inconsistency and fallacious reasoning in a way, of course, that honors the commitments of the person being interpreted. My default assumption when dealing with expert philosophers is that all of their commitments, both those explicitly stated and those entailed by those explicitly stated, are consistent with each other and that their conclusions would at least be probable on the assumption that their supporting premises are true. Sometimes, no doubt, this default assumption will fail to match reality. Given the limited intellectual powers of humans and their tendency toward wishful thinking, even the most developed in their philosophical expertise will make logical slips. But even though I do not close myself off from the possibility that a philosopher is illogical just because my default and hard-to-break assumption is that he or she is not, and even though my natural inclination is in fact to regard past thinkers as open to criticism by contemporaries, I believe at the same time that one must attempt to embody the thinkers in question and, especially when dealing with a thinker whose expertise is renowned, explain away any apparent illogicality. Such effort, moreover, is expected not just with contextualizing and exegetical sorts of engagements with philosopher P, but even with other sorts of engagement that I respect and practice: the sort of engagement that aims to reconstruct more impactful version of P’s view, or that aims to be critical and evaluative of P’s view, or that aims to explain what P would or should say when confronted with a given situation, or that aims to use P simply as a launching off point for one’s own contribution to contemporary philosophical issues.
Despite the disparate subject-matter of my published and unpublished works, many have as their central aim sympathetic interpretation: trying to understand where a philosopher is coming from, how his or her view is consistent, how his or her view is more resourceful than acknowledged, and so on. This should be evident from my project abstracts here.
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FAQ
I am much more inclined to support the old truth that we, properly speaking, have only eyes and ears for what we know. The musician by profession hears, in an orchestral performance, every instrument and every single tone, whilst one unacquainted with the art is wrapped up in the massive effect of the whole. A man merely bent upon enjoyment sees in a green or flowery meadow only a pleasant plain, whilst the eye of a botanist discovers an endless detail of the most varied plants and grasses. . . . [That said,] we . . . are very likely to fall too easily into [a] pedantic conceit when we do not look beyond the narrow circle which surrounds us. I therefore like to look about me in foreign nations, and advise every one to do the same. . . . [T]he epoch of World literature is at hand, and every one must strive to hasten its approach. But, while we thus value what is foreign, we must not bind ourselves to anything in particular, and regard it as a model. We must not give this value to the Chinese, or the Servian, or Calderon, or the Nibelungen; but if we really want a pattern, we must always return to the ancient Greeks, in whose works the beauty of mankind is constantly represented. All the rest we must look at only historically, appropriating to ourselves what is good, so far as it goes.—Goethe (Conversations with Eckermann)
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"Crank Shaft" is a study in the irreducibility of fractured consciousness. Its narrator sits immobile on a curb in the aftermath of a child's death — a death he witnessed, could not prevent, and is implicated in by the precise act through which he was prevented from acting. The piece does not pursue his guilt as a legal or even moral verdict. It pursues something harder: the way consciousness, under the pressure of catastrophic self-implication, does not consolidate into remorse or clarity or collapse, but continues generating its ordinary traffic — desire, calculation, self-interest, animal solidarity, spiritual hunger, mortality, artistic ambition — at the same frequency it always did, except now without the possibility of relief or discharge.
The title operates at multiple levels simultaneously, and its multiplicity is the piece's thesis in compressed form. "Crank shaft" is, mechanically, the component that converts reciprocal piston motion into rotational force — the machine's engine of transformation, turning one kind of movement into another. Cars have crankshafts. The car that kills the boy is driven by one. But "crank" as verb is also slang for masturbation, and "shaft" carries its own phallic register. The narrator was cranking when the shaft of the car's wheel passed over the boy's skull. The title fuses these two motions — the man's reciprocal autoerotic action and the mechanical rotation of the killing wheel — into a single mechanism, implying that the two chains of causality the narrator watches converge are not coincidental but structurally linked: joined in the crankshaft of the title before the event even occurs.
The opening paragraph achieves its effects through deliberate impoverishment cut with a single startling sensory intrusion. "I have not gotten up from the curb. The ambulance had taken the body long ago. I just sit here." The sentences are meager, sequential, declarative. But into this minimalism arrives the smell of the officer's menstruation — "the copper sourdough of her menstruation" — a detail whose precision is as shocking as its placement. The narrator's erotic register is operational even here, even now, even with the police beside him taking his words about a dead child. The smell is gone but he keeps sensing her presence. His consciousness cannot exempt even this moment from its ordinary appetitive attention. This is the piece's central psychological claim established in its first paragraph: the machinery does not stop for catastrophe.
The expanded stillness passage is the revision's most significant formal achievement. The earlier version's quiet neighborhood hush is here given a specific and devastating genealogy: the children whispering in the wake of a parental spat that escalated from screams and shattered glass into something else entirely — "throttled taunts gushing out from the pretzeled mound of mommy on the floor ('Beat it up, nigga! Beat that asshole up!')" — with the children deliberately kept as audience: "Keep it open! Let em see the shit." The neighborhood hush is now rhymed explicitly with the hush of children who have witnessed their mother's orgiastic absorption in violence and sex simultaneously, kept watching by adult insistence. This is the Gonzo Domestic Squabble template transposed into the narrator's own street: the children made witnesses to adult intensity they cannot process, the animals registering what the humans cannot. The dogs have stopped their chronic digging and whining. The stillness is the stillness of a neighborhood that has absorbed too much.
The Georgie passage is the piece's single most accomplished writing, and it earns that designation through the specificity of its attention. Georgie is fully named, fully individuated — a runt found two summers back, a feral cat whose forced adulthood in New York extremes has left him with "needs neglected," who seeks the narrator's hand "with a crying desperation" even as that same hand triggers in him the "spiritual bind between having to make biscuits and having to maintain the sleepless guard." The Bach comparison — the braced sidewinding walk described as "the haunted-castle organ opening of Bach's 'Toccata and Fugue in D minor, BWV 565'" — is the piece's most extravagant simile, and it earns its extravagance because the precision is exact: every muscle fiber fighting itself, the body contorted enough to produce a specific, unmistakable sound in the observer's imagination. Georgie does not come to the narrator today. He slinks back into coverage. The cat that has always permitted the narrator's touch has read something in the scene, in the man, that warrants withdrawal. The piece does not explain what Georgie knows. It asks the question — "What does he know?" — and leaves it open.
The retrospective account of the mother's ass and the boy's death proceeds as in earlier versions, but two revisions sharpen the psychological argument. First, the interior monologue during the voyeurism is now more explicitly voiced — "Bet that shit taste so fuckin good" — making the erotic consciousness more audible, more present, less retrospectively constructed. Second, the crucial exculpatory move of the marathon analogy now concludes with "People masturbate" — a sentence of devastating baldness. Having built the logical case that bodily states do not disqualify action, the narrator collapses the case into its simplest possible statement. The argument reaches its terminal point and the terminal point is nothing more than a declaration of ordinariness. People masturbate. The child is dead.
The unreleased load comparison — "The unreleased load has befuddled my loins like Georgie" — is the revision's most darkly comic and most psychologically precise detail. The narrator's physically unresolved state is compared to the cat's psychic rack: both bodies in a bind between competing needs, neither able to fully discharge or fully guard. The comparison refuses the dignity of clean suffering. The narrator on the curb is not a man in grief; he is a man in an unresolved physiological state that the afternoon's events have made unresolvable, compared to a feral cat with a complicated relationship to being touched. The loins and the cat belong in the same sentence. The piece knows this.
The mortality passage is the revision's most significant addition and it transforms the piece's meaning at its deepest level. The narrator has chosen art over family — "I have chosen the pursuit of glory over family" — and has chosen not merely glory but the most demanding and least rewarded form of it: to stand on an astral plane alongside Nietzsche and Emerson, which "requires enough truth telling to be hated while alive." The physical inventory that follows — the hip flexibility declining, the sparse crown, the nighttime urination, the coming day when seated breathing will require rest — is not self-pity but accounting. The narrator is taking stock of what his choices have produced and what they have cost. "Who now is left at my side to tolerate my repetitions and back my tall tales? Will there be anyone even to fake like they are interested? What hand will guide me back to before the womb?" These are not rhetorical questions. They are the questions of a man who has organized his life around solitude and art and is now sitting on a curb with no one coming for him, understanding perhaps for the first time the full cost of that organization. His son is present but the narrator notes it and immediately returns: "But I cannot stop working." The addiction to art is the crankshaft that has been running beneath everything else. The child's death is not the piece's only subject. The narrator's life is.
The intrusive sexual fantasy — slurping the mother, whispering "I'm gonna give you another baby" — returns and is if anything more devastating in this version because it follows directly from the mortality passage. The man who has just inventoried his aging body and his chosen solitude now fantasizes about giving a grieving mother another baby. The libidinal unconscious's attempt at reparation — giving back what the crankshaft took — is continuous with the piece's larger argument about what the narrator has cost himself and others through his chosen mode of existence.
The closing movement achieves its effect through the replacement of sitting with lying. "I lie back." The earlier version held the narrator upright on the curb; this version surrenders him to the ground. "I can feel the planet's core latched to my bones, its implacable suckle — all draw, no release." The gravitational image gives the inertia a cosmic dimension: the narrator is not merely tired or numb but held by a force operating at the level of mass and planetary attraction, a force that is all draw and no release, which is the piece's final description of the crankshaft mechanism. Everything has been drawn in — desire, guilt, mortality, art, the dead child, the unreleased load, the cat's knowledge — and nothing has been released. The sun bothers his face. He has reason to get up. But how can I? The question is not rhetorical. It is genuine. The piece ends where the crankshaft has always been: turning without being able to stop, unable to convert its motion into anything that would allow rest.
Formally, the piece's syntax continues to move between meager declarative sentences and long recursive clauses in a rhythm that mimics the narrator's oscillation between numbness and eruption. The Georgie passage is the piece's longest and most syntactically elaborate, and its elaborateness is earned: the cat's complexity of being — the spiritual bind, the braced sidewinding walk, the Bach comparison — requires the long sentence because the cat cannot be rendered in the short one. Everything else tends toward the short sentence because the narrator's consciousness, in its catastrophic state, cannot sustain elaboration for long before the elaboration collapses back into the declarative. The prose thinks and stops. Thinks and stops. The crankshaft turning.
Meta Description
A revised and deepened prose piece in which a narrator's vigil on a curb after a child's death — caused by his masturbation — accumulates new dimensions: the cop's menstrual smell, the neighborhood's orgiastic backstory, Georgie the cat rendered in Bach, a mortality passage about art chosen over family, and a gravitational closing image of a body held to the ground with all draw and no release.
Keywords
Crank Shaft, psychological fragmentation, trauma prose, erotic consciousness and catastrophe, moral culpability literature, Georgie the cat, Bach Toccata and Fugue, art versus family, mortality and artistic ambition, masturbation and catastrophe, intrusive fantasy, gravitational inertia, close reading, Hypocorism, crankshaft mechanism